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The regional governments of Catalonia and Scotland have argued that they would be 
able to remove their region from their respective host state and gain automatic entry 
to the European Union. This is what is known in academia as an “internal 
enlargement” of the European Union. This dissertation will argue, firstly, that 
advocacy on behalf of the feasibility of an “internal enlargement” can be considered 
an example of “normative entrepreneurship” and could have potentially far - reaching 
effects for European integration. Secondly, this dissertation will attempt to delineate 
some of the areas of this emerging “political norm” which can be regarded as 
problematic for the pursuit of European integration as a means of forwarding a 
political agenda that favours the creation of a European demos and truly 
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Mass political movements advocating self – determination in Catalonia and Scotland 
are nothing new in either region – read Balcells (1996) or Smith (2014) for an overview of 
Catalan nationalism, and Harvie (1994) or Devine (2012) for Scotland. What is unusual about 
these movements in their most recent incarnations is how they operate within the paradigm 
change the European Union has brought to bear on international relations.  
 
Theorists of “Europeanisation”, an analytical concept that political scientists have 
used to refer to the effects of European integration on politics, have been pointing out since 
the mid – 1970s that the EU has re – written the legal relationships between European 
individuals, European governments and international organisations in potentially 
unprecedented ways (Zaborowski, 2004; Landrech, 2010; Börzel & Panke, 2013; Pollack, 
2015). Combined with the unique history of the European Union, an organisation which 
emerged with the purpose of preventing another war on the European continent (Hewitson & 
D'Auria, 2012; Phinnemore, 2013; Urwin, 2013), there have emerged areas of political 
contention where greater ethico – normative clarity is required (Weiler, 2012; Walker, 2017).  
 
This dissertation is concerned with one of those areas of contention: the possibility of 
an “internal enlargement” of the European Union via a referendum on self – determination in 
Catalonia or Scotland. It is written from the perspective of someone who sees an “internal 
enlargement” as problematic because, should such a move be endorsed by the institutions of 
the European Union and its Member States, it would create more problems for the bloc than it 
would solve. As of 2017, the Guardian newspaper had documented a total of 21 regions in 
the European Union, including Catalonia and Scotland, that are seeking independence 
(Henley et al. 2017). None of those regions, because of the democratic nature of their host 
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state, would be entitled to secession under international law (Weiler, 2012; Walker, 2017), 
and the institutions of the European Union already face more independent states than they are 
deigned to handle (Lewis, 2013). The EU would be endorsing a trend toward regional ego – 
centrism and fragmentation at a time in which its multiple existential crises demand a greater 
level of solidarity between the “peoples” of Europe.  
 
My interest with this dissertation is to call attention to “areas” of the proposed 
“internal enlargement” that are problematic, as a means of advancing a political agenda for 
the creation of a pan – European demos. It has been over fifteen years now since German 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas called for a European constitution (Habermas, 2001), and, 
since then, a collection of diverse intellectuals and entities, gathered in the Democracy in 
Europe Movement (DiEM25) have been advocates for the creation of truly representative 
European institutions as the best development possible for European integration (DiEM25, 
2018). If the proponents of a “Catalonia in Europe” or a “Scotland in Europe” are as 
concerned with democracy as they claim to be (Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015) then they 
should be capitalizing on the democratic impetus that their politics have created (Crameri, 
2015; Convery & Harvey, 2015) and pushing for a more ambitious version of European 
integration in which all Europeans, regardless of the economic wealth of their region of 
origin, are able to influence the EU policy – making process. 
 
Plan of the study  
 
The plan of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter Two, I will argue that nationalist 
politicians in Catalonia and Scotland have sought to construct a new political “norm” of 
“ internal enlargement”, and that their advocacy should concern us because of its 
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transformative potential for European integration. Chapter Three will be a short literature 
review of legal scholarship on “internal enlargement”, with the purpose of providing some 
clarity for the discussion ahead. In Chapter Four, I will briefly introduce the methodology I 
have used in the dissertation – the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) developed by 
Riesigl & Wodak (2014) – provide a brief rationale for my selection of sources, and outline 
how I will approach each source for analysis. 
 
In Chapters Five through Nine, I will examine examples of political discourse related 
to “internal enlargement”, taken from high – profile politicians in Catalonia and Scotland. I 
will outline the discursive strategies these politicians have used to “sell” “internal 
enlargement” to the public, and then proceed to problematize one aspect of their “sales 
pitch”, ranging from the compatibility of “grievance – based nationalism” with the European 
Union to the argument that an “internal enlargement” will be “easy”. The motivating research 
questions of this dissertation are thus: a) Can we say that the Catalan Generalitat and the 
Scottish government have sought to produce a political norm of “internal enlargement”? and 
b) If so, what aspects of this norm can be said to be problematic? Chapter Ten will be 
devoted to the conclusion.  
 
“Who is the political self” asks Joseph Weiler in his essay on Catalonia “that has the 
right to determine whether or not the historical nation…will be broken up?” (Weiler, 2012, 
pg. 911). Inspired by Weiler, we could ask a similar question when debating the cases of 
European regions such as Catalonia and Scotland: Who is the (European) political self that 
would be created through an “internal enlargement”? The answer to this question, as we shall 
see, is much more complex than is readily apparent. 
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Chapter Two: Normative entrepreneurship in Catalonia and Scotland 
– A new political norm for “internal enlargement” 
 
 What is “internal enlargement”? 
 
“Internal enlargement” is the idea that a region from a EU Member State could secede 
from that Member State without leaving the institutions of the European Union entirely 
(Closa, 2017; Piris, 2017). As such, it is fundamentally different from an external 
enlargement of the EU, a process which requires that sovereign states such as Albania or 
Turkey apply for membership of the bloc from the outside via Article 49 of the Treaty of the 
European Union. Art. 49 (1) reads: 
 
“Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 (primarily respect for democracy 
and the rule of law) and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union” 
 
(TEU,1992, cited in EUR-lex, 2007, text in parentheses added for clarification) 
 
Following Art. 49 TEU, applicants to the EU must implement an extensive list of 
policies in their own states, related to democracy, respect for human rights and market 
economics (European Commission, 2016). They must also commit to adherence to the aim of 
ever greater “political, economic and monetary union” in conjunction with the rest of the EU 
Member States (European Commission, 2016, para. 5). The European Commission will asses 
the completion of these requirements by potential candidates, and, if satisfied, the European 
Council will agree to begin negotiations on accession (European External Action Service, 
2016). 
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Both the Catalan Generalitat and the Scottish Government have argued that their 
regions could, theoretically, continue to enjoy the full benefits derived from EU membership 
– barring formal political representation in Brussels – after a peaceful, democratic vote to 
secede the United Kingdom or Spain (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). In 
such a scenario, they would be remaining (incomplete) de iure members of the Union during 
a transitional period until they could become de facto Member States (Scottish Government, 
2013; Bossacoma, 2017). This is what is known as the internal enlargement of the European 
Union. 
  
 A political norm for “ internal enlargement”  
 
In political science, a norm or rule is defined as “a standard of appropriate behaviour 
for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1989, pg. 891). Norms, write March 
& Olsen (2008, pg. 693) “prescribe, more or less precisely, what is appropriate action”.  
 
The defining feature of a political norm lies its quality of oughtness (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1989; March & Olsen, 2008): it is a moral argument that is expected to guide the 
actions of (political) actor(s) in a given (political) situation. We can hear strong echoes of 
oughtness in the arguments of pro – independence politicians such as Raül Romeva for 
Catalonia or Alex Salmond for Scotland. Consider the following quotes: 
 
“What I’m saying – is that it’s possible, it’s perfectly possible, that one part of a Member State 
becomes a new state in the European Union. In the EU Treaties, you do not find any point, any 
article, where you expulse anyone” 




“Now, the decision (of whether to allow an “internal enlargement” to take place) is one for 
Member States. But not to recognise the democratic will of Scotland would run counter to the 
entire European Union ideal of democratic expression and inclusion. It would pose a challenge to 
the integrity of the European Union even greater and more fundamental than the threat of British 
withdrawal” 
   (Salmond, 2014, 9:23 – 9:42, text in parentheses added for clarification) 
 
These quotes were taken from discussions on “ internal enlargement”: the quote from 
Mr. Romeva is from a 2015 interview on BBC Hard Talk, while the one from Mr. Salmond is 
from a speech he gave in Aberdeen in 2014. Both men were clearly making normative 
arguments when they spoke: “internal enlargement” will take place because we are entitled to 
remain in Europe, or because our process of secession has been fundamentally democratic.  
 
However, one can remain skeptical of Romeva or Salmond’s claims. The Catalan 
Generalitat and the Scottish Government may be using normative arguments, one may think, 
but this does not make them de facto “normative entreperneurs”.  
 
My argument in favor of viewing the promotion of “internal enlargement” as 
“normative entreperneurship” is three – fold. Political scientists such as Hopkin (2016) have 
argued that the primary drive for secession in rich European regions such as Catalonia, 
Scotland, Bavaria or Flanders is not emancipatory but developmental. However, even when 
dealing with a subject as dry as economics, moral contentions are inescapable: indeed, there 
is a field of ethics called distributive justice that deals primarily with the ethical dimension(s) 
of economics (Tan, 2010). For example, it is undisputed that a region such as Catalonia, a net 
contributor to Spain, would be leaving the rest of Spain worse off were it to become an 
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independent state (Bel, 2015; Cotarelo, 2016), and this raises important questions of 
economic re – distribution. Political proposals that represent a particular understanding of 
“right” and “wrong” are inherently a form of “normative entrepreneurship”.  
 
Secondly, the legal approach that the Generalitat and the SNP have proposed for 
“internal enlargement” has been buttressed by a range of experts drawing on well – 
developed ethico – normative arguments (Matas i Dalmases et al. 2011; Edward, 2012; 
Avery, 2012; Ridao & González Bondía, 2014). These arguments are drawn from traditions 
such as distributive justice, democratic theory, political philosophy, normative theory and 
European integration studies, and deserve respect as free – standing normative arguments in 
their own right.  
 
Finally, the unique nature of the European Union, which derives a great part of its 
strength as an inter – governmental organisation from its normative character (Kenealy, 
2014), means that an “internal enlargement” could acquire great normative strength should it 
ever be endorsed by the EU. How could the Union keep a straight face when telling a region 
such as Flanders or the Basque Country that the same “standard of appropriateness” it 
accepted in the event of Catalan or Scottish independence would not apply to the quest for 
statehood of other EU regions? 
 
The transformative potential of “internal enlargement”  
 
 I have argued above that Catalonia and Scotland are engaging in “normative 
entreperneurship” through the promotion of an “internal enlargement” of the EU. But what 
difference should such an abstract eventuality make to the layman? Shouldn’t he be more 
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concerned with the situation of human rights in Spain (Amnesty International, 2017) or with 
ensuring that a (possible) secession is carried out in a fair and democratic way? 
 
Most seasoned observers of EU politics would agree that an “internal enlargement” 
would represent the culmination of two normative developments that have been brewing for 
some time now: the increased salience of regionalist politics in the EU and the emergence of 
a “Primary Choice” theory of secession. An instance of “internal enlargement” would be a 
turning point in European history and could encourage an avalanche of secessions of a 
similar breadth (but not, hopefully, genocidal consequences) of that which followed the fall 
of the Hapsburg Dynasty or the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Hobsbawm, 1993). 
 
Toward a “Europe of the Regions”? 
 
The first “significant normative development” that was alluded to is the increased 
salience of regionalism in the European Union (Loughlin, 1996; Luedtke, 2005).  
 
A region is defined in political science as “a level of government and/or 
administration…found between the central state and the province, department or country” 
(Loughlin, 1996, pg. 146). Regionalism “refers to an ideology and a political movement 
advocating greater control by regions over their political, economic, and social affairs” 
(Loughlin, 1996, pg. 148).  
 
The “regional question” has appeared periodically in the history of European 
integration (Loughlin, 1996), but the current salience of regionalism dates to the 1980s and 
owes its importance to the de – centralizing momentum unleashed by globalisation (Luedtke, 
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2005). The establishment of the European Regional Development Fund in 1975 and the 
Committee of the Regions, a consultative EU institution, in 1994, represented watershed 
moments for regionalist politicians such as former President of the Generalitat Jordi Pujol, 
(Loughlin, 1996), although it was the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity – the idea that 
social and political issues are managed most effectively at a local level – in the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 which cemented the status of EU regions as an indispensable element of EU 
governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). 
 
The success of regionalist politicians in the European Union has generated much of 
the momentum that is carrying advocacy for “internal enlargement”. The political entities 
which now advocate “internal enlargement”, such as the (now defunct) Convergència i Unió 
party or Esquerra Republicana Catalana (ERC), were previously passionate advocates of 
greater independence for European regions within current institutional structures (Giordano 
& Roller, 2002) under the slogan of “a Europe of the Regions”. Their radicalization may have 
been born from their realisation that the levels of autonomy they had previously hoped to 
achieve “within the system” were politically untenable.  
 
A Primary Choice Theory of Secession 
 
The second “significant normative development” which was referred to above is the 
emergence of the “Primary Choice” theory of secession (Buchanan, 2017; Walker, 2017). 
The two main theories of secession – Remedial Right and Primary Choice or Primary Right – 
will be addressed more fully during the literature review. Suffice it to say for now that most 
international lawyers would not recognize the right of Catalonia or Scotland to become an 
independent state, because these two regions do not fulfil the basic requirements of 
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international law orthodoxy: a) that the “people” in question demanding statehood be 
repressed, or b) that the “people” demanding statehood find themselves in a situation of 
colonisation (Walker, 2017).  
 
Nevertheless, this orthodoxy has been challenged in recent years by a 
conceptualization of a right to secession as the right of a national minority to be “taken 
seriously” (Walker, 2017, pg. 38). According to Buchanan (2017, para. 15) “Primary Right 
Theories…contend that the right to secede can exist even when the group has not been 
subjected to any injustice”. This view of secession has been seized upon by international 
lawyers sympathetic to the “plight” of the people of Catalonia and Scotland (Matas i 
Dalmases et. al. 2011; Ridao & González Bondía, 2014) and has become an article of faith 
for opportunistic politicians (Weiler, 2012). While “Primary Choice” advocates may proceed 
from different regions of the world, their advocacy has generated normative arguments that 
can be used in advocacy of internal enlargement as well (Scottish Government, 2013; 
Bossacoma, 2017). If the Catalans or Scots have a right to be “taken seriously” in their host 
states, why not in Europe as well? 
 
Of norms and normative cascades 
 
In their seminal work on norms in international relations, Finnemore & Sikkink, 
(1998) develop a concept known as the “life – cycle of norms”. This “life – cycle” has three 
stages: an initial stage of “norm emergence”, in which normative entreperneurs develop a 
new norm and attempt to convince a critical mass of states to adopt their new norm; a second 
stage called the “normative cascade”, taking place after the critical mass of states is reached, 
at which point a large number of states – perhaps the majority – begin to adopt the new norm; 
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and a final stage of “norm internalization” where the norm has become so common – place in 
international relations that it has acquired a “taken – for – granted quality” (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998).  
 
Using the concept of the “life – cycle of norms”, I have attempted to conceptualize 
below how an EU endorsement of “internal enlargement” could (potentially) become a 
turning point for both regionalists and advocates of “Primary Choice” theory secession: 
 
Figure 1: How “internal enlargement” could (potentially) change European 






My hope is that the above diagram is self – explanatory. We currently find ourselves 
at the first stage of the conceptualization. If we were ever to reach the second stage via an EU 
endorsement of “internal enlargement”, international law orthodoxy would be dealt a serious 
blow. EU regions would then become more powerful overnight, as they would be able to 
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hang the spectre of secession over the head of their host states should they disagree with any 
of its policies. But once we arrived at the second stage, it is difficult to see why the process 
should stop there. With the two main deterrents for European secessionists – the possibility of 
non – recognition of their new state and exclusion from the Single Market – removed via the 
creation of an “internal enlargement precedent”, we could witness a cascade of additional 
“internal enlargements” within months. 
 
Some may see a more atomized European Union as desirable. Bossacoma (2017) in 
particular argues that allowing a greater fragmentation of the EU would make European 
integration easier because smaller states could not put up as much resistance to this process. 
However, with greater diversity comes a greater variety of (national) interests, and it does not 
proceed that a Union that struggles to coordinate policy between 27 Member States (Balmer, 
et al., 2018) should find it easier when more join the club. For these reasons “internal 
enlargement” is important and it is for these same reasons that it is best to begin to critique it 






















Chapter Three: Literature Review of “Internal Enlargement” 
 
 
Most of what has been written on the topic of “internal enlargement” is legal 
scholarship. Given this situation, I will use the literature review section to provide anwers to 
some legal issues surrounding “internal enlargement”, and to argue that my dissertation is 
relevant to existing literature on “internal enlargement” because it discusses important issues 
at the intersection of politics and law. 
 
What does international law say about a secession in Europe? 
 
 As I mentioned in Chapter Two, before joining the EU as an independent state, 
Catalonia or Scotland would first have to become independent states. In contemporary 
international relations, this would be no easy task, because international law takes a very 
strict view of secession (Buchanan, 2017; Piris, 2017: Medina Ortega, 2017; Walker, 2017).   
 
 Under the “Remedial Right” theory, which currently dominates the international law 
orthodoxy, secession is only justified “if some basic injustice is present and uncorrected” in 
the relationship between the central state and the region that wants to leave (Walker, 2017, 
pg. 38). These “basic injustices” are generally understood to mean a) political repression or 
b) colonization (Buchanan, 2017; Walker, 2017), neither of which are believed to be fulfilled 
in Catalonia or Scotland at this point in time (Weiler, 2012). 
 
 Nevertheless, this “Remedial Right” theory of secession has been criticised for being 
too strict and challenged by an emerging “Primary Choice” or “Primary Right” theory of 
secession (Buchanan, 2017; Walker, 2017). There are two intellectual variants of the 
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“Primary Choice” theory, “Ascriptivist” and “Pleibiscitarian”, with the intentions of the Euro 
– nationalists falling squarely into the “Pleibiscitarian” school of thought (Buchanan, 2017). 
According to Pleibiscitarian “Primary Choice” theorists, a self – identified peoples only need 
meet two requirements to secede from their host state: a majority in a (democratically 
organized) referendum on self – determination, and the fulfillment of a “State Viability 
Requirement” or “State Viability Proviso”: that is, the proof that the emerging state would be 
a viable one in that it would be able to perform all the functions expected of it (Buchanan, 
2017). 
  
Would an independent European state that emerged via a referendum be recognised by other 
states? 
 
This is a key question, because a state cannot (in practice) function as a state unless it 
is recognised by other states (Lauterpacht, 1944; Worster, 2009), and a non – state cannot join 
the European Union (European Commission, 2016). In this regard, statehood is similar to a 
monopoly: new states are entirely dependent on established ones for recognition (Worster, 
2009). The 1993 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which is 
considered to be the authoritative document on statehood (Worster, 2009) states: 
 
“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent 
population; b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states.”  
 
     (The Governments represented in the Seventh International Conference of American States, 1993, Art. 1) 
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 An independent state that emerged from an EU Member State, most likely being 
Catalonia or Scotland, would undoubtedly meet all of the Montevideo criteria (Weiler, 2012). 
But then again, there are several entities that meet the legal requirements of statehood – Kosovo 
being a case in point – and are not recognised by their peers due to political reasons, while 
there remain entities that do not meet all the requirements of the Montevideo Convention – the 
Vatican does not possess a “permanent population”, Israel does not possess a “defined territory” 
– but are recognised as states by their peers (Worster, 2009).  
 
The key difference between failiure or success for Euro – nationalists rests between a 
hypothetical declaration of independence and a subsequent recognition of their independent 
state, a period during which they will have to lobby other governments for recognition with no 
guarantee of success. Ridao & González Bondía (2014) argue that the international community 
has treated recent instances of secession in Eastern Europe and the Balkans quite favorably, 
although due to the very different socio – political circumstances in those regions, it is far from 
clear that the resolution those conflicts can provide any clues for expectant Catalans or Scots. 
The outcome of a succesful secession in contemporary Western Europe remains shrouded in 
mystery.  
 
How do Catalan and Scottish nationalists propose to achieve an “internal enlargement”? 
 
Both the Generalitat and the Scottish Government have proposed that, once a 
majority of their “peoples” endorses independence in a democratic referendum, their new 
nation should receive immediate recognition from the EU as an independent state (BBC 
Scotland, 2013; Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015), and they would proceed to “re – write” the 
relationship of their region with the European Union through Article 48 of the TEU, the 
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article that provides for the amendment of the EU Treaties (Scottish Government, 2013; 
Bossacoma, 2017). In effect, what they are proposing is the legalization of “internal 
enlargement” through the creation of a new pathway to EU membership. Art. 48 (2) TEU 
reads: 
 
“The Government of any Member State, the European Parliament or the Commission may submit to the 
Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties. These proposals may, inter alia, serve either to 
increase or to reduce the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties. These proposals shall be 
submitted to the European Council by the Council and the national Parliaments shall be notified.” 
 
(TEU,1992, cited in EUR-lex, 2012a) 
 
The Scottish Government, which is the entity that has come the closest to achieving 
“independence in Europe” has suggested that a “transitional period” of 18 months would be 
sufficient to re – negotiate Scotland’s membership of the EU “from within” (Owen, 2014), 
during which, as mentioned at the beginning of Chapter Two, Scotland would continue to 
enjoy all the benefits derived from full EU membership barring political representation 
(Scottish Government, 2013). This proposal was seconded by lawyers sympathetic to Scottish 
independence (Avery, 2012; Edward, 2012). In academia, the idea of an “internal 
enlargement” through Art. 48 has also been met with some support (Matas i Dalmases et. al. 
2011; Kenealy, 2014).  
 
In addition to these proposals, Ridao & González Bondía (2014) have argued that, 
should an EU region ever become an un – recognised independent state, it could still remain 
within the Treaties of the EU and the EU Single Market until it obtained formal recognition. 
There is a precedent for this: the citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
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(TRNC), which is only recognised as sovereign by Turkey, became EU citizens when Cyprus 
joined the European Union in 2004 (Ridao & González Bondía, 2014). This is because the de 
facto partition of Cyprus in 1974 has never been de iure recognised by the international 
community, and international treaties that are ratified by the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) take 
legal effect across the entire island (Ridao & González Bondía, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
TRNC has no political representation within the European Union (Ridao & González Bondía, 
2014). 
 
What does the European Union say about “internal enlargement”? 
 
The European Commission, which is responsible with up – holding the Treaties of the 
European Union, has gone out of its way to challenge the position of the governments in 
Catalonia and Scotland on “internal enlargement” (Barroso, 2012a; Barroso, 2012b; 
European Commission, 2017a; Reuters, 2017). In his correspondence with the British House 
of Lords, Former EU Commissioner Barroso (2012a, pg. 1) argued that: 
 
“If part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that state because it were to become a 
new independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a new 
independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the EU 
and the Treaties would no longer apply on its territory.” 
 
The other EU institution that has pronounced itself on “internal enlargement” is the 
Committee of the Regions, the EU organ that is tasked with connecting the regions of the 
European Union to Brussels. In point 63 of its Draft Report, the Committee agreed that: 
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“if a region, having achieved independence, wanted to join the EU, it would be required to make a formal 
application to the Council and to follow the accession procedure under Article 49 TEU in the same way as 
any other country that wished to become an EU Member State” 
(Committee of the Regions, 2013, point 63) 
 
 The case for “internal enlargement” has not yet been brought before the European 
Court of Justice, the EU institution that has the final say on matters pertaining to the Union. 
Governments of EU Member States such as Spain have been adamant that “internal 
enlargement” not take place (Murray, 2012; The Scotsman, 2014), although advocates of 
“internal enlargement” have suggested that these Member States would change their minds, 
once a vote to become independent had crystallized and they came to terms with the 
economic dislocation that removing the region in question from the European Union would 
cause them (BBC Scotland, 2013; Salmond, 2014; Romeva, 2015).  
 
Is there such a thing as European citizenship, and can it shield Catalans or Scots from being 
removed from the Union? 
 
 A common argument by proponents of “internal enlargement” is that “their people” are 
entitled to remain in the European Union because they already hold European citizenship. This 
argument was expressed by Catalan pro – independence campaigner Raül Romeva in 2015: 
 
“One thing is a territory, the other thing is a people. I mean, I’m a Spanish national right now, and as a 
Spanish national I have the European citizenship. You cannot expulse 7.5 (million) people out of the 
European Union” 
              (Romeva, 2015, 11:22 – 11: 34) 
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 This argument was articulated in a legal form by a group of Catalan constitutional 
scholars, who argued that, because it is the aspiration of the European Union to become a 
federation, citizenship of the EU should be treated as the a right of those who currently 
posses it: 
 
“Effectively, the individuals unique status in the European Union, especially following the Maastricht 
Treaty, is defined by the concept of citizenship, understood as a legal and political bond between the 
Union and individuals” 
       (Matas i Dalmases et. al. 2011, pg. 27) 
  
While many (the author included) find the emergence of a United States of Europe or 
of a pan – European demos desirable, it is a fallacy to claim that we have arrived at that stage. 
Possession of European citizenship is additional to, not independent of, citizenship of an EU 
Member State. Art. 20 (1) of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union clearly 
states: 
 
“Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the 
Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.” 
(TFEU, 2007, cited in EUR-lex, 2012b) 
 
 Furthermore, it is (conceptually) misleading to invoke the canard of EU citizenship 
when advocating for an internal enlargement of the European Union, as Matas i Dalmases et. 
al. (2011) have done, because proposals for an “internal enlargement” have much more in 
common with aspirations for a “Europe of the Regions” than they do with aspirations for a 
“Europe of the Citizens”. If the possession of a free – standing European citizenship is the 
 24 
salient feature of membership of the European Union, why are advocates of “internal 
enlargement” so concerned with fragmenting the EU into nationalities?  
 
Is there a precedent for internal enlargement of the EU? 
 
There is no legal or political precedent for internal enlargement of the EU. We have 
already examined the case of Cyprus put forth by Ridao & González Bondía (2014), which, 
while not a precedent for what “internal enlargement” aspires to, may provide us with a 
possible road – map.  
 
Bossacoma (2017) has suggested that the case of German re – unification may provide 
us with possible clues as well.  According to Bossacoma (2017), the merging of the Democratic 
Republic of Germany (DRG) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 could be considered a case of “internal enlargement” of the EU in the sense 
that the FRG – an EU member state – absorbed the DRG – a non-EU member state – without 
the need for an accession process. The decision to allow the DRG to join the Union was 
approved overnight by the Council of the European Union in 1990 (Bossacoma, 2017). Blair 
Jenkins, the chief executive of the “Yes Scotland” campaign, was of the same mind: 
 
“An example to look at (referring to a possible precedent of internal enlargement) is East Germany. East 
Germany when it re – united with West Germany joined the European Union overnight. Now that was on 
the basis of 40 years of Communist dictatorship…I think if a territory the size of East Germany can overnight 
become part of the EU, then the notion that Scotland…would find itself in a more difficult position than that 
is absurd” 
(Jenkins, 2012, cited in BBC News, 2012, 4:37 – 5:08, text in parentheses added for clarification) 
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Similar to the examples of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, it is important to keep in 
mind that the re – unification of Germany took place under very different socio – political 
circumstances to the ones currently enjoyed by the EU regions in Western Europe. The clues 
this case can offer us with regards to the current “theaters” of “internal enlargement” are 
therefore not readily apparent. 
 
What can a problematic of “internal enlargement” offer legal scholarship on “internal 
enlargement”? 
 
 Scholars of the law have a limited framework when it comes to assessing the moral 
implications of legal arguments. By outlining areas of the proposed “internal enlargement” 
which can be considered problematic, we can enable a discussion of issues which are not 
readily visible or accesible to experts of of the law, whether it be constitutional, European or 
international. For example, from the perspective of legal scholarship, the legal argument 
made by Matas i Dalmases et. al. (2011) that EU citizens are entitled to EU citizenship 
regardless of their national affiliation is just one more tool in the “legal tool – kit” of 
advocates of an “internal enlargement”.  
 
Approached from a normative perspective, however, the issue acquires a different 
hue. If the distinctive feature of the European Union is that it is an emerging federation, then 
there are several pathways that can be used to address the grievances of Catalans and Scots. 
These regions can leave the Union and attempt to re – enter as independent states. They can 
expend energy on convincing the EU establishment that an “internal enlargement” should be 
allowed for. Or they can work to deepen European integration from where they currently are, 
striving to make the European Union fairer, simpler and more representative. Perspectives 
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like these are what a problematic of a “political norm” of “internal enlargement” can 
contribute to legal research.  
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Chapter Four: Methodology, sources and plan of action 
 
 
In this chapter I will briefly I will also briefly address my selection of sources and 
provide an outline for the following chapters. I will also introduce the methodology – the 
Discourse Historical Approach or DHA – and some analytical concepts – discourse, rhetoric, 
enthymemes and topoi – that that I will be using in the main section of the dissertation.  
 
Why have I chosen to problematize “internal enlargement” through political 
discourse and not through some other medium? 
  
I believe that the discursive strategies that politicians use when advocating a 
particular action – particularly the ones surrounding the creation of political arguments – 
inherently possess the greatest potential for problematization, because it is at the level of 
discursive strategies that we can best detect the presence of fallacies, contradictions, 
conflations and mis – representations. In addition to this, each piece of discourse I selected 
came from an authoritative figure within the Catalan or Scottish nationalist camp, which I 
hope will lend my problematic some weight in terms of generalizing the findings presented 
here. Below is an overview of the following five chapters: 
 
Table 1: Sources and problematic 
 
Chapter Main interlocutor Means used to 
deliver discourse 
Area of problematic 
Five Carles Puigdemont, 




Entitlement to EU 
Membership on basis 
of history 
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Six Nicola Sturgeon, 
current First Minister 
of Scotland  
Speech Compatibility of 
grievance – based 
nationalism with EU 
ideals 
Seven Blair Jenkins, former 
CEO of the “Yes 
Scotland” Campaign 




Eight Raül Romeva, former 
head of defunct 
“Junts Pel Si” 
electoral coalition 
Interview Claims that “internal 
enlargement” will be 
easy 
Nine Alex Salmond, former 
First Minister of 
Scotland 
Speech “Internal enlargement” 
and democracy 
 
 In addition, I provide a brief description of the methodology and the analytical 
concepts that will be used in these chapters below. 
 
Discourse and political discourse 
 
Discourse is defined as a “verbal interchange of ideas” (Merriam - Webster, 2018) or 
as “a formal discussion of a topic” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018a). As such, it is a different 
concept from political rhetoric, which is defined as “the art of effective or persuasive 
speaking or writing” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018b), although both terms can be used 
interchangeably. When looking at the arguments that proponents of “internal enlargement” 
have made, I have sometimes found it helpful to reduce them to the structure of an 
enthymemes in order to better examine what is being said. 
 
Figure 2: Example of a syllogism  
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Premise One (Objective Statement): All fish have gills 
Premise Two (Objective Statement): No mammals have gills 
Conclusion: Therefore, a whale cannot be a fish 
 
Figure 3: Enthymeme 
Premise One (Objective Statement): Spain has a democratic responsibility to Catalonia 
Premise Two (Subjective Statement): Spain has neglected Catalonia 
Conclusion: Therefore, Catalonia should seek assistance from entities outside of Spain 
 
 (information on syllogisms and enthymemes comes from Arnhart, 1981) 
 
The Discourse Historical Approach 
 
 The Discourse Historical Approach or DHA is a methodology developed by Riesigl & 
Wodak (2014) for the analysis of political discourse within the field of Critical Discourse 
Analysis. As the main impetus of my dissertation is critical – I seek to problematize “internal 
enlargement” – this choice seemed more appropriate than a methodology in the more 
conventional field of Discourse Studies. There is a graphic outline of the DHA below: 
 




(from Boukala & Wodak, 2015, pg. 93) 
 
Table 2: Discursive Strategies recognised by the Discourse Historical Approach 
 
 






Linguistic means used to 
realize topics and 
strategies
Discursive Strategy Objectives Example 
Nomination Discursive construction of social 
actors/objects/phenomena/events and 
processes/actions. 
“The Scottish people” 
Predication Discursive qualification of social 
actors, objects, phenomena, events/ 
processes and actions (more or less 
positively or negatively) 
“After a vote for Scottish 
independence, the EU will 
greatly desire for Scotland to 
remain part of the Union”  
 
Argumentation Justification and questioning of 
claims to truth and normative 
rightness 
“You cannot remove the 
Catalan region from the 
European Union because there 
is no article in the Treaties 
that covers for the secession of 
a region”  
 
Perspectivization Positioning speaker’s or writer’s 
point of view and expressing 
involvement or distance 
“The central issue that 
concerns us is democracy”  
Intensification/ Mitigation Modifying (intensifying or 
mitigating) the illocutionary force 
and thus the epistemic or deontic 
force of utterings. 
“The 1st of October 
referendum was an exceptional 
moment of historical 
dimensions”  
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I have de – constructed each sample of discourse using the DHA, paying particular 
attention to the discursive strategy of (political) argumentation which is recurring in 
discussions of “internal enlargement”. I have also found the concept of topos, a dialectical 
scheme which reflects the “commonsense knowledge” (endoxa in the Aristotelian tradition) 
that orators hold (Charteris - Black, 2014; Boukala & Wodak, 2015), quite illuminating when 
conducting my analysis. Below are some examples of common topos that political orators 
can use:  
 
Table 3: Common topos (from Boukala & Wodak, 2015, pg. 96) 
 
Topos Example 
Topos of opposites “If war causes us all this damage, then we 
should make peace” 
Topos of definition “If someone believes that evil is related to the 
Gods, then he believes in the existence of 
Gods” 
Topos of syllogism that starts with the 
specific and concludes with the general 
“If some human beings do not trust their 
property to a specific group of people, then 
they cannot entrust their salvation to that 
same group of people” 
 
Structure of following chapters 
 
In each chapter, I will provide an opening paragraph of context for the text under 
analysis. I will then provide a discussion of the discursive strategies and arguments featured 
in the context of the DHA methodology, and select one feature that I feel is problematic to 
discuss in a final section. The expectation is that keeping with this structure enables me to 
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After the turbulent scene described in Chapter One, acting Catalan President Carles 
Puigdemont appeared before the Catalan Parlament to, in his own words, “present the 
results of the referendum…and explain its political consequences” (Puigdemont, 2017c, 
para. 1). While Puigdemont doesn’t mention “internal enlargement” explicitly in his 
speech, I have selected it because it provides an excellent overview of the perceived 
political situation which, in the eyes of the nationalist – run Generalitat, would justify 
the unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia from Spain, expected to trigger 




Puigdemont begins his speech stressing the exceptionality of the moment – using a 
discursive strategy of intensification, according to the DHA – before linking this 
exceptionality to Europe by making the argument– using an argumentation strategy in the 
DHA tradition – what has transpired – the Generalitat sponsored referendum on self – 
determination, and subsequent police violence – is inextricably linked to Europe: 
 
“We live in an exceptional moment, of historical dimensions. Its consequences and effects go 
much farther than our country and it has become evident that, far from being a domestic and 
internal affair as we have often been told by those who have neglected their responsibility in 
understanding what was going on, Catalonia is a European affair” 
 
      (Puigdemont, 2017, para. 2, emphasis added) 
 
Throughout the speech, Puigdemont makes an argument about Spain which could be 
expressed in the following syllogism:  
 
Enthymeme 1 (Puigdemont) 
 
Premise One (Objective): Spain has a democratic responsibility to look after Catalonia 
Premise Two (Subjective): Spain has neglected Catalonia 
Conclusion: Therefore, the situation in Catalonia should concern those outside of Spain 
 
 Puigdemont uses most of his speech to outline the grievances of the Catalan people 
against the Spanish state as a means of justifying the exceptionality of the political situation – 
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a region hosted within a democratic state, poised to make a unilateral declaration of 
independence. This could be considered part of an argumentation strategy, in that the entire 
speech is an attempt by Puigdemont to justify the situation in which the nationalist – run 
Generalitat finds itself. 
 
“Catalonia believed that the Spanish Constitution of 1978 could be an appropriate starting point to 
guarantee its self – government and its material progress” 
 
(Puigdemont, 2017 para. 13) 
 
“The passing of the years, however has allowed us to confirm that…the hegemonic elites of the 
state understand it (referring to the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which does not allow for a 
referendum on self – determination in Catalonia), not as a starting point (for democracy in Spain), 
but as an ending point” 
 
         (Puigdemont, 2017, para. 14, text in parentheses added for clarification)  
 
“The Spanish political system…has activated a systemic and aggressive program of re – 
centralization” 
       (Puigdemont, 2017, para. 19)  
 
“This (referring to the police violence of the 1st of October, 2017) has been the answer of the 
Spanish state to Catalan demands” 
 
    (Puigdemont, 2017, para. 25, text in parentheses added for clarification)  
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I will end by noting Puigdemont’s remarkably consistent identification of Catalonia 
with Europe, using both nominative and argumentative discursive strategies. He does so up to 
four times in his speech: 
 
“It is the first time in the history of European democracies that a poll has taken place in 
the midst of police violence” 
(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 7) 
 
“Catalonia was thoroughly involved in the operation of returning the Spanish state to 
European and international institutions after 40 years of autarky and isolation” 
 
(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 13) 
 
“There is a prayer for dialogue that is running across Europe, because Europe already 
feels apprehensive about the effects of a bad resolution of this conflict” 
 
(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 35) 
 
“To the European Union, I demand that you involve yourself thoroughly and that you 
look after the foundational values of the Union” 
(Puigdemont, 2017, para. 37) 
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Problematic: “Internal enlargement” cannot take place on the basis of 
historical ties to Europe 
 
Identification with Europe has been a consistent feature of both Catalan and Scottish 
nationalism since the appearance of nationalism in these territories in the late 18th century 
(Balcells, 1996; Harvie, 1994; Devine, 2012; Smith, 2014), and one hears echoes of this in 
Puigdemont’s speech. Even though Spain and the United Kingdom have historically been 
perceived as peripheral to (meta – geographical) Europe (Fletcher, 1992; Abulafia, 2015), 
proponents of “internal enlargement”, such as former President of the Generalitat Jordi Pujol 
or Scottish historian Sir Tom Devine, have gone to great pains to stress the special European 
character of their regions: 
 
“Especially, in contrast to those that, from the beginning, contributed in the greatest amount to the 
creation of Spain…Catalonia was born as a Carolingian March…which should be considered as 
the Europe of that historical period” 
(Pujol, 1991, para. 2) 
 
“If you take mainland Britain, then Scotland has long been the less insular part…Scotland’s 
linkage with Europe has been longer than its link with the Commonwealth, the Empire or with 
England” 
     (Devine, 2017, cited in McDonald, 2017, paras. 7 – 9) 
        
The possibilities inherent in this line of reasoning are evident: if we have always been 
a part of Europe, then we should not be asked to leave the EU.  
 
 38 
EU membership being open to any country “in Europe”, however (European 
Commission, 2016),  means that there are currently five (nominal) candidate countries 
(Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) and two (nominal) potential 
candidates (Bosnia – Herzegovina and Kosovo) working their way through the conventional 
accession procedures as per Art. 49 TEU (Official Website of the EU, 2018). Some of them, 
such as Albania or Serbia, are relatively poor nations have been waiting to become EU 
members for over a decade (Official Website of the EU, 2018). If wealthy regions in Western 
Europe feel so strongly about independence, should not they consider leaving the Union for a 
time to join and joining the accession queue as Commissioner Barroso has suggested (BBC 
News, 2012b)? Identification with Europe is one of the areas of “internal enlargement” that 
















Chapter Six: Nicola Sturgeon calls for a second referendum on 




The aftermath of the “Brexit” vote in June 2016 led to renewed calls for a second 
referendum in Edinburgh. On the 13th of March 2017, two days before the British Prime 
Minister triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, the Scottish First Minister gave a 
speech in Edinburgh calling for a second poll on independence. I have selected 
Sturgeon’s speech because, like Puigdemont’s, it showcases many of the perceived 






Like Puigdemont, Sturgeon dedicates most of her speech to outlining the 
unaddressed grievances of the Scottish people to justify her call for a second 
referendum (argumentation). As we have seen with the former President, Sturgeon 
begins her speech by using intensificatory illocutionary strategies that illustrate what, 
based on her reading of the post – Brexit political landscape, is a truly exceptional 
situation: 
 
“Right now, Scotland stands at a hugely important crossroads” 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 3) 
“We didn’t choose to be in this position” 
       (Sturgeon, 2017, para. 4) 
 
  “In common with most people across the country, I wish that we weren’t” 
 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 7) 
 
“As a result of the Brexit vote we face a future, not just outside the EU, but also outside the 
world’s biggest single market” 
       (Sturgeon, 2017, para. 8) 
 
“All of this has massive implications for Scotland (referring to the “Brexit” vote)” 
 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 13, text in parentheses added for clarification) 
 
 41 
Notice how Sturgeon says, “in common with most people across the country, I 
wish we weren’t” (Sturgeon, 2017, para. 7). It is a well-known fact that a majority of 
the British public voted for “Brexit” (BBC News, 2014a). Sturgeon here is subtly 
using a discursive strategy of nomination by discursively constructing the Scottish 
people as an entity distinct from the English. The subtle uses of nomination are 
frequent throughout her speech. It is clear throughout the speech that Brexit is viewed 
as an imposition on Scotland, and the (perceived) negative consequences of Brexit are 
often identified with England. For example: 
 
“Some predict that the Tories (the British Conservative party, which in the post – war era 
has been concentrated in England) could be in power now at Westminster until 2030 or 
beyond” 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 8, text in parentheses added for clarification) 
   
The British state is described (predication in the DHA) as an intransigent and 
difficult political actor. Its actions have placed the future of the people of Scotland in 
jeopardy (Sturgeon, 2017).  
 
“Since last June, my focus has been on trying to find an agreement with the UK government 
that would reconcile the UK wide vote to leave with the Scottish vote to remain” 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 23) 
 
“But today as we stand, for all we know, on the eve of Article 50 being triggered, not only 
is there no UK – wide agreement on the way ahead – but the UK government has not moved 
even an inch in pursuit of compromise and agreement” 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 30) 
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“Our efforts at compromise have been met with a brick wall of intransigence” 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 31) 
 
“UK membership of the single market was ruled out with no prior consultation with the 
Scottish Government or with other devolved administrations – leaving us facing not just 
Brexit, but a hard Brexit” 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 32) 
 
“There has been talk of special deals for the car industry and others, but a point-blank 
refusal to discuss in any meaningful way a differential approach for Scotland” 
 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 33) 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that Sturgeon, like Puigdemont, identifies Scotland’s 
future with Europe throughout her speech. This could be considered part of an argument 
(argumentation) that she and other SNP – related figures (BBC Scotland, 2013; 
Salmond, 2014) have made about the desirability of an independent Scotland in Europe.  
 
“In short, it is not just our relationship with Europe that is at stake (referring to the potential 
effects of “Brexit”) 
     (Sturgeon, 2017, para. 17, text in parentheses added for clarification) 
 
  “What is at stake is the kind of country we will become” 
(Sturgeon, 2017, para. 18) 
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I would like to start this short section by modifying Nicola Sturgeon’s statement slightly: 
when contemplating “internal enlargement”, what is at stake is the kind of Europe we will 
become. The re – trenchment toward the “Europe of the Regions” that was envisioned by 
regionalists (Loughlin, 1996), while well intentioned, may make it more difficult for us to 
achieve a genuine European demos and a “Europe of the Citizens”, if only because the kind of 
nationalism espoused by Puigdemont and Sturgeon has a poor track record of conceiving for 
distributive justice beyond national boundaries (Weiler, 2012). But suppose we allow for an 
independent Catalonia or Scotland to become an EU Member State using the “fast – track” 
accession procedure envisioned by many (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). 
Should grievance – based nationalism have a place in the European Union?  
 
The answer to this question would most likely be negative. In their masterful study of 
the intellectual origins of the European Union, Hewitson & D'Auria (2012) argue that the 
defining feature of the “European idea” was the urgency with which European elites sought to 
put history behind them. Keeping in mind that the process of European integration moves in 
fits and starts (the “Emtpy Chair” crisis of 1965 being a case in point) the European Union 
owes its current form to the efforts of European elites to reach past their respective grievances 
to each other (Urwin, 2013). Walter Hallstein, the first President of the EU Commission, had 
fought for the Nazis (European Commission, 2017b), while Konrad Adenauer, the first 
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, had been their political prisioner (European 
Commission, 2017c), but this did not impede both men from working tirelessly to create the of 
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the European Coal and Steel Community, a precursor institution to the European Union 
(European Commission, 2017b; European Commission, 2017c). 
 
Any parallels between the post – war years and today’s EU regions should be 
contentious. People living on the European continent today have different concerns than they 
did in 1945 and the nature of European regional relations is has been fundamentally 
transformed (Berezin, 2009: Hopkin, 2016; Judis, 2016; Kriesi & Pappas, 2016). Berezin (2009) 
goes as far as arguing that nationalism cannot pose a threat to Europe today because nationalist 
politics have become self – contained. However, it is apparent that the lessons of the founding 
fathers that one can control one’s relationship to history (European Commission, 2017b; 
European Commission, 2017c) have been undoubdtedly lost on today’s generation of “Euro – 
nationalists”, who present a secession based on historical wrongs as something inevitable and 
inescapable (Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017). That the push for “internal enlargement” of 










On the 18th of January 2013, the BBC’s Douglas Fraser interviewed Blair Jenkins, chief 
executive of the “Yes Scotland” independence campaign and put to him a series of 
independence – related questions that had been sent to BBC Scotland by viewers. The 
interview took place three months after the Edinburgh Agreement and with the 
campaigns for the “Yes” and “No” votes already in full swing. This is the first source 
in this dissertation that contains discourse dealing explicitly with “internal 
enlargement”. I have selected it because it provides an overview of some of the 
arguments that Scottish nationalists would use in favour of “internal enlargement” and 
because, as head of the “Yes Scotland” campaign, Mr. Jenkins statements on “internal 





Jenkins begins making arguments (argumentation) about “internal enlargement” early 
on in the interview, after Fraser asks him a question regarding Scotland’s currency plans, post 
– independence: 
 
“Jenkins: Well, we know as a matter of fact that Scotland cannot be compelled to join the Euro once 
we are an independent country, we will continue membership of the European Union from a position 
of being within the European Union, terms and conditions of membership will have to be 
negotiated…” 
 
    (Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 5:20 – 5:33) 
 
Fraser immediately confronts him on his argument about continued EU membership, 
demanding greater clarity, to which Jenkins replies citing the opinion of Sir David Edward 
(2012), a Scottish lawyer and academic who is supportive of Scottish independence.  
 
“Jenkins: At the point when we vote ‘Yes’, legally, in good faith, the European Union, at that 
point, has to begin negotiations with Scotland on the terms and conditions of Scotland’s 
continuing membership” 
 
                                          (Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 5:54 – 6:06, emphasis in original). 
 
The sentence “in good faith” originates from Art. 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, considered part of customary international law, which states that:  
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“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose” 
 
(VCLT, 1980, cited in Edward, 2012, para. 2) 
 
and it is misleading to mention it in relation to potential negotiations on “internal 
enlargement”, unless Mr. Jenkins is suggesting that the “ordinary meaning” of the Treaties of 
the European Union was to allow for new states to join the bloc without having to apply for 
membership. 
  
However, when Fraser pushes his interviewee for solid evidence to back up this 
claim, Jenkins switches tack and begins to argue that “internal enlargement” is ultimately a 
political decision: 
 
“Jenkins: Well, the important point which David Edward makes is this is not a legal decision, it 
will not be a legal decision. There is nothing in the European treaties that covers the scenario that 
we’re looking at here” 
 
                                           (Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 8:06 – 6:06, emphasis in original). 
 
The interview is at its most valuable for this dissertation when Jenkins begins to make 
arguments (argumentation) regarding why Member States would allow an “internal 
enlargement” to take place. Consider the following arguments: 
 
“If you think about the fundamental narrative of the “NO” campaign, it is this assumption that the 
rest of the world will want to make life difficult for a newly independent Scotland, that we would 
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be emerging into a hostile environment where people behave irrationaly towards us. The truth is, 
the rest of Europe will be very keen to have Scotland as a member of the European Union” 
 
 (Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 6:32 – 6:39, emphasis in the original) 
 
“There is every reason to suspect that the institutions of the European Union – and ideed the rest 
of the UK, once Scotland votes to be independent – will act in enlightened self – interest” 
 
     (Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 9:22 – 9:31, emphasis added) 
 
“A mature democracy like Scotland, which has been in continued membership of the European 
Union and complying with all the terms and conditions for over 40 years…I mean, we look like a 
gold plated member of the European Union – why on Earth would they not wish us to be 
members?” 
 
                            (Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 9:48 – 10:02, emphasis in the original) 
 
Jenkins is making two arguments (argumentation) here about the political situation 
that would result if a majority of Scots voted to secede the UK in a referendum on self – 
determination. I note that in the fifth minute of the interview Jenkins implied certainty when 
he stated that Scotland would “continue membership of the European Union from a position 
of being within the European Union” (Jenkins, 2013, cited in BBC Scotland, 2013, 5:25 – 
5:30), casting a suspicious light on the arguments he made later on. Nevertheless, I will 
examine the arguments he makes in turn. 
 
The first argument about “internal enlargement” that Jenkins makes could be called 
the enlightened self – interest or rationality argument: 
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Enthymeme 1 (Jenkins) 
 
Premise One (Objective statement): The European Union is a self – interested organisation 
Premise Two (Subjective statement): Continued Scottish membership will provide many 
benefits to the European Union 
Conclusion: Therefore, Scotland will remain in continued membership 
 
 By making this argument, Jenkins could also be said to be using a topos of rationality, 
with the endoxa or “reputable opinion” being: when faced with an existential challenge, all 
parties involved must act rationally (i.e. in a utility – maximising manner). Jenkins’ second 
argument could be called an absence of wrong – doing argument:   
 
Enthymeme 2 (Jenkins) 
 
Premise One (Objective statement):  One must follow the terms and conditions of the European 
Union to continue in membership 
Premise Two (Subjective statement):  Scotland will continue to follow the terms and conditions 
of the European Union  
Conclusion: Therefore, Scotland will remain in continued membership  
 
Depending on what perspective one takes, this argument could be considered to be 
fallacious: Scotland would not be breaking any “hard” law in the event of an “internal 
enlargement”, but the Committee of the Regions has pronounced itself against this possibility 




Problematic: Associations of “internal enlargement” with the Enlightenment  
 
Many of the words that Mr. Jenkins employs in his discourse – rationality, 
enlightened self – interest, democracy – also refer to concepts that originated in the period of 
European history known as the Enlightenment. The philosophical legacy of the 
Enlightenment, particularly a utilitarian reading of European international relations, features 
heavily in the Romeva interview, which is examined in Chapter Eight: 
 
“The European Union is a very pragmatic project. And I’ve seen, thousands of times that a situation 
that seems to be a problem, an unsolvable problem, then, you suddenly get up and find a solution” 
 
     (Romeva, 2015, 12:48 – 12:59, emphasis in original) 
 
 The policy proposals of the Generalitat and the Scottish Government are also 
described using Enlightenment concepts. For example, in his report on “internal 
enlargement” for the Generalitat, Bossacoma (2017) argues that an independent “Catalonia 
in Europe” would inherently be a champion of free trade: 
 
“Small states have a greater interest in free commerce and the free movement of capital then larger states. 
Small states have a greater dependency on imports, and, because they cannot affect the prices of the global 
market, their optimal tariffs tend to be zero” 
(Bossacoma, 2017, pg. 36) 
  
We can trace a direct conceptual line between Bossacoma’s language and the work of 
Scottish Enlightenment political economist and philosopher Adam Smith (Smith, 2012).  
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As the Enlightenment is a historical period that is remembered warmly and in high 
regard, the implications of this association are apparent: “internal enlargement” is possible, 
progressive, civilized. However, should we try to trace a conceptual line between the 
concrete political proposals of Catalan and Scottish nationalists and the Enlightenment, we 
would find greater difficulties. The insistence on achieving formal statehood for these 
regions, despite their already impressive levels of self – government, would probably have 
the most in common with the political thought of Johann Gottfried Herder, a German 
Enlightenment thinker who viewed the nation – state as the paragon of human virtue that all 
stateless peoples should aspire to (Herder, 1999). In his Letters for the Advancement of 
Humanity, Herder wrote of stateless peoples: 
 
“If a people does not respect itself, how can others respect it, and in turn be respected by it? Only a nation 
with the will and strength to defend itself, and a constitution suited to the times, is a true nation”  
 
(Herder, 1999, pp. 211 – 212) 
  
 Herder’s relationship with the Enlightenment was complex, as his ideas conflicted 
with the dominant tendency at the time to perceive human improvement as (potentially) 
unlimited, and his political thought cannot therefore be considered to be representative of 
those times (Williams, 1999). The (emerging) federation of states that advocates of “internal 
enlargement” aspire to be a part of does share some of its features with the vision of 
Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1999), a more representative Enlightenment thinker; but the political 
proposals of “Euro – nationalists” may be perceived to jar with Kant’s ethos because of their 
insistence that the Union should give them preferential treatment vis-à-vis other candidate 
states (Scottish Government, 2013; Bossacoma, 2017). Isn’t one of the core tenets of the 
Enlightenment a belief in equality? The connections that advocates of “internal enlargement” 
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have sought to construct between their policy proposals and the Enlightenment are one of the 





























In September of 2015, Raül Romeva, who was then the head of the Junts pel Si pro – 
independence coalition in the Catalan regional parliament, agreed to appear on the BBC 
program “Hard Talk” to discuss his career and his objectives. Similar to the Jenkins 
piece, I have selected this interview because much of the conversation was centered on 
Europe and on the suggestions of Catalan nationalists, such as Romeva, than an 
“internal enlargement” of the EU was possible and desirable. Romeva was speaking 




Statements regarding “internal enlargement” 
 
The host of the show begins by questioning the importance of the push for secession 
from Spain in Catalonia: 
 
“Host: I’m sure you would agree that right now, Europe faces massive challenges on a continental 
scale, and yet here you sit, a  man seemingly obsessed with a local, parochial issue..” 
 
“Romeva: What I am obsessed about - what we are obsessed about – is democracy”  
        (Romeva, 2015, 0:55 – 1:20) 
 
Right from the outset, Romeva frames (perspectivization in the DHA) the issue under 
discussion – the push for secession in Catalonia, which in 2015 had not yet acquired the status 
of a full – blown territorial crisis – in terms of the excersise of democracy. The excersise of 
democracy is certainly an issue in Spain, with its contentious treatment of protesters (Amnesty 
International, 2017) and its asymmetric federated constitution (Börzel, 2002), but it is a 
falsehood to claim that the main issue the Junts pel Si coalition is concerned about is not the 
national self – determination for Catalonia. Self – determination, as we witnessed in the late 
20th century struggles of de – colonization in Southeast Asia (Hobsbawm, 1993; Anderson, 
2006), is not inextricably bound up with democracy.  
 
When asked about the rule of law in Spain shortly afterwards and whether it would not 
be more democratic to respect the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court regarding a 
referendum on secession from Spain in Catalonia, Romeva argues (argumentation) that the 
rule of law and the excersise of the democratic rights of individuals/collectives should go hand 
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in hand in a EU member state, implying that this is not the case in contemporary Spain (Romeva, 
2015). This argument could be expressed in the following syllogism: 
 
Enthymeme 1 (Romeva) 
 
Premise One: The rule of law and democracy should go hand in hand in EU member states 
Premise Two: Spain has failed to live up to this ideal 
Conclusion: Therefore, it has become acceptable for Catalan nationalists to disobey the law 
 
It is contentious whether this syllogism would constitute a true syllogism, where both 
of the premises are true, or an enthymeme, in which one of the premises – Spain has not acted 
in line with EU norms – is subjective. With regard to Catalonia, Spain has always acted in 
accordance with its 1978 Constitution (Cotarelo, 2018), which was considered democratic at 
the time of Spain’s accession to the EU in 1985, and the position of the EU Commission is 
that territorial disputes are internal matters for Member States to resolve (European 
Commission, 2017a). However, reputable human rights watchdogs such as Amnesty 
International have expressed their concern about the situations of democracy in Spain 
(Amnesty International, 2017). 
 
The show host then challenges Romeva on his past statements about Europe during his 
career as a politician: 
 
“Host: Why haven’t you and the other leaders of your campaign been honest with the people 
about the implications of secession/independence for Catalonia’s place in the European Union?” 
 
(Romeva, 2015, 8:57 – 9:09) 
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Romeva refutes the charges of misleading voters and proceeds to make a series of 
arguments (argumentation) in favor of the “internal enlargement” of the EU. At two points 
during the interview he makes a negative legal argument when he states that an independent 
Catalonia could, theoretically, be entitled to EU membership because there is no provision in 
the EU Treaties that forbids it.  
 
“Romeva: What I’m saying – is that its possible, its perfectly possible, that one part of a member 
state becomes a new state in the European Union. In the EU Treaties, you do not find any point, 
any article, where you expulse anyone” 
(Romeva, 2015, 9:17 – 9:54, emphasis in original) 
 
“Romeva: In practical terms, it is not written anywhere that if the Catalonia would become an 
independent state, it would be expelled from the EU, legally speaking” 
           (Romeva, 2015, 12:38 – 12:44) 
 
This negative legal argument, which was not included in the literature review because 
of its simplicity, has practically become an article of faith for certain individuals that have 
become invested in the prospect of an “internal enlargement”. “What article of the European 
Union” declared a defiant former President of the Generalitat, Artur Más, in 2015 “allows for 
the expulsion of 7.5 million European citizens? Have you ever spoken with Mr. Cameron 
(referring to the former British Prime Minister) or Mrs. Merkel (referring to the current German 
Chancellor) about this?” (Más, 2015, text in parentheses added for clarification). Romeva and  
Más are correct in stating there is no explicit legal prohibition of “internal enlargement”, but 
this should not ammount to an endorsement of “internal enlargement”. 
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The host remains unconvinced by this claim, insisting that constitutional scholarship is 
against what Mr. Romeva was arguing, so Romeva switches tack and begins to talk abou the 
political consequences of a Catalan unilateral declaration of independence: 
 
“Romeva: The European Union is a very pragmatic project. And I’ve seen, thousands of times that 
a situation that seems to be a problem, an unsolvable problem, then, you suddenly get up and find a 
solution” 
 
     (Romeva, 2015, 12:48 – 12:59, emphasis in original) 
 
“Romeva: They know that keeping the Catalonia out of the European Union and out of the Eurozone 
– it’s a problem for them too” 
(Romeva, 2015, 14:53 – 14:59) 
 
As the interview draws to a close, what is most striking about the exchange are the 
similarities with the Jenkins interview. Both politicians began by talking about the law and 
ended talking about politics (BBC Scotland, 2013; Romeva, 2015). While this may be a 
reflection of the weakness of their legal arguments, it may also reflect the political uncertainty 
that would be unleashed should either region decide to secede its host state. 
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Problematic: “Internal enlargement” will be easy  
 
One of the arguments that we have seen proponents of “internal enlargement” make in 
the last two sections is that such a political manoeuvre would not face any resistance by the 
rest of the Member States. Once a Catalan or a Scottish demos voted for secession, the 
Member States of the European Union would act as rational utility maximisers, allowing the 
new nation to negotiate it’s new “terms and conditions” from within (BBC Scotland, 2013; 
Romeva, 2015). This kind of reasoning, which is conceptually connected to the linking of 
“internal enlargement” with the Enlightenment, is surprisingly reminiscent of many 
arguments that we have heard from prominent Breexiters. For example, in January 2017, 
former UKIP leader Paul Nuttall reminded listeners of the following: 
 
“It will be easy to negotiate a trade deal (with the European Union), and of course, it’s in the European 
Union’s interest, just as it is in ours”  
 
  (Nuttall, 2017, cited in Barnes, 2017, para. 5, text in parentheses added for clarification) 
 
 A few months later, international trade secretary Liam Fox stated the following on the 
“Britain Today” programme: 
 
“The free trade agreement that we will have to do with the European Union should be one of the easiest in 
human history…The only reason that we wouldn’t come to a free and open agreement is because politics 
gets in the way of economics” 
(Fox, 2017, cited in Weaver, 2017, paras. 2 - 4) 
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 That politics often gets in the way of economics is a well – known fact to students of 
international relations. Governments have only recently (the post – war era) begun to see free 
trade as desirable (O'Brien & Williams, 2016), and there is every sign that we are in the 
process of reverting to a mercantilist way of conducting world politics. But more importantly, 
as Alexander Wendt (1992) argued in his seminal article, what may seem like rational 
behavior for one (emerging) state may not seem like rational behavior for another. This is 
because the national interest of a state, far from arising from exogenous situations, is 
grounded in the unique identity of each state, which is endogenous (Wendt, 1992). As a 
result, different states will react very differently to the situations that arise in international 
relations, even if they have similar national identities. Witness the Trump White House 
leaving the Iran Nuclear Deal as liberal, capitalist allies such as Germany or France fight so 
desperately to preserve it in the same year. 
 
 While the Breexiters assumed that the European Union would act in economic self – 
interest once the dust of the Brexit debate had settled, the reality is that the EU sees other 
potential “defections” from the Union (via Art. 50) as an existential threat, and so far seems 
willing to absorb considerable economic pain (a “No Deal” scenario) if this will prevent other 
countries from leaving its bloc. Due to the similar arguments, but also due to the “leap – in – 
the – dark” approach that both Breexiters and proponents of “internal enlargement” have 
advocated, the idea that an “internal enlargement” will be easy pressuposes a common 
rationality for all political actors and this is something problematic. 
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On the 17th of February, 2014, 7 months from the date of the Scottish referendum, Alex 
Salmond addressed business leaders in the city of Aberdeen. While Salmond devotes 
most of his speech to making the case as to why a currency union with Britain would 
be feasible, post – independence, I have selected this speech because he also addresses 
some of the contentions regarding a potentially independent Scotland in the EU. As 
usual, Salmond’s opinions on “internal enlargement” are authoritative due to his 
position at the top of the Scottish Government at the time (Owen, 2014).  
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Statements on “internal enlargement” 
 
Salmond first broaches the topic of “internal enlargement” approximately eight 
minutes into his speech, by countering an argument made by former EU Commissioner 
Barroso against “internal enlargement” the previous day: 
 
“In the event of a ‘Yes’ vote, the campaigning will stop and the common-sense agreements will 
start” 
     (Salmond, 2014, 7:55 – 8:02, emphasis in original) 
 
“And I would submit that the same democratic logic applies to the comments of Mr. Barroso 
yesterday” 
(Salmond, 2014, 8:08 – 8:13, emphasis in original) 
 
Barroso had appeared on the Andrew Marr show (UK) and argued that it would be 
“difficult, if not impossible” (Syal, 2014, para. 1) for an independent Scotland to join the EU. 
This view is consistent with the authoritative legal argument of the Commission that a state 
emerging from an existing Member State would have to apply for EU membership via Art. 
49 TEU, requiring consensus of all Member States: 
 
“We've seen that Spain has been opposing even the recognition of Kosovo, for instance, so it's to 
some extent a similar case because it's a new country and so I believe it's going to be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, a new member state coming out of one of our countries getting the 
agreement of the other [existing member states]." 
(Barroso, 2014, cited in Syal, 2014, para. 6) 
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Like Jenkins and Romeva, Salmond appears to be using a topos of rationality in his 
rhetoric. The endoxa, or common-sense argument, would appear be the following: when 
faced with an existential challenge, all parties involved must act rationally (i.e. in a utility – 
maximising manner). The EU, personified by Barroso, is represented in Salmond’s speech as 
an inherently political actor (predication) and therefore untrustworthy when it comes to 
claims of truth and normative rightness (arguments). It is interesting to note that Salmond 
conceptualizes politics in his speech as having distinct phases, each one governed by a 
different logic. There is a pre – campaign stage for planning, a campaign stage for politicking 
and a post – campaign stage for acting in a professional and restrained manner. 
 
Like Jenkins, Salmond cites the opinion of distinguished lawyers – in this case, Sir 
David Edward and Graham Avery, a distinguished scholar of European law – when speaking 
of the legal status of Scotland, post – independence: 
 
“As Sir David Edward, formerly from the European Court of Justice has pointed out, from the 
point of a “Yes” vote, what is certain is that EU law would require all parties to negotiate in good 
faith and in a spirit of cooperation” 
     (Salmond, 2014, 8:15 – 8:29, emphasis in original) 
 
“Or as Graham Avery, the honorary Director – General of the EU Commission, has argued, in 
front of the Scottish Parliament, a European Union which had admitted so many countries from all 
points of the European compass will find a pragmatic way to accommodate the expression of 
democratic will from the people of Scotland” 
(Salmond, 2014, 8:30 – 8:50) 
 
Salmond also cites the opinion of James Crawford, the expert on international law 
that was consulted by Westminster, in support of his point (Salmond, 2014). In mentioning 
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these three figures, Salmond is making an argument (argumentation) regarding how we 
should view the resolution of “internal enlargement”, that could be expressed in the following 
syllogism: 
 
Syllogism 1 (Salmond) 
Premise One: Scotland’s membership of the EU will be determined according to the law 
Premise Two: Highly regarded experts of the law claim it is possible for Scotland to remain a 
member of the EU 
Conclusion: Therefore, Scotland will remain a member of the EU 
 
Salmond could also be using a topos of expertise or authority, with the endoxa being: if one is 
uncertain of the outcome of a particular action, one should first consult the experts on said 
action. 
 
However, his argument is fallacious, and Salmond contradicts himself in the next 
breath by claiming (argumentation) that “internal enlargement” of the EU is ultimately a 
political matter:  
 
“Now, the decision is one for member states. But not to recognise the democratic will of Scotland 
would run counter to the entire European Union ideal of democratic expression and inclusion. It 
would pose a challenge to the integrity of the European Union even greater and more fundamental 
than the threat of British withdrawal” 
        (Salmond, 2014, 9:23 – 9:42) 
 
“That is why, of course, no Member State suggested it would seek to block Scottish membership” 
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(Salmond, 2014, 9:44 – 9:51) 
 
In other words: the opinion of the experts ultimately doesn’t make a difference in this 
matter; this issue will be settled by numbers alone. This is a repetition of the common 
nationalist mantra that we have seen before (BBC Scotland, 2013) (Romeva, 2015) 
(Mandojana, 2016). However, in this fragment of his speech Salmond makes his most 
powerful argument in favour of “internal enlargement”. The European Union is about 
democratic expression and inclusion; if Scotland, a member of that European demos, makes a 
democratic decision, it should be respected and accommodated because it coheres with the 
EU’s most fundamental values. Implicitly, Salmond would seem to be grounding his 
argument on a vision of the EU as a “Europe of the Citizens” (nomination in the DHA).  
 
Ending with that comment about Member States and Scottish membership, Salmond 








Problematic: “Internal enlargement” and democracy 
 
This is perhaps the most important area of “internal enlargement” to problematize, so I 
will include a quick re – capitulation of what we are problematizing in the first place. “Internal 
enlargement” is the political proposal that EU regions should be allowed to secede from their 
host state and continue to benefit from the EU Treaties (primarily through access to the Single 
Market) while re – applying for EU membership (Chapter Two). The motivation for “internal 
enlargement” is primarily developmental (Hopkin, 2016), and an EU endorsement of an 
“internal enlargement”, if only tacit, could represent a turning point in European international 
relations, paving the way for the appearance of a host of new European states (Chapter Two).  
 
If one considers democratic governance to be important, it is essential that one should 
discuss such a potentially transformative event in terms of democracy. I note that nationalists 
in Catalonia and Scotland speak very highly of the “democratic nature” of the European Union 
(Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017; Torrà, 2018a; Torrà, 2018b), and sometimes have 
refferred to Art. 2 TEU as evidence that the Union is instrinsically democratic (Edward, 2012; 
Kenealy, 2014). Art. 2 TEU reads: 
 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
 
(TEU,1992, cited in EUR-lex, 2012a) 
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I also note that European regionalists hold democracy (in general) in high – regard: it 
was the liberalization of politics, after all, that allowed parties such as Convergència i Unió or 
the SNP to win elections and pursue national self – determination (Balcells, 1996; Devine, 
2012; Torrance, 2013; Bel, 2015; Cotarelo, 2018). The politics of nationalists in Catalonia 
and Scotland have been credited with de – creasing levels of democratic dissafection in those 
regions (Crameri, 2015; Hassan & Barrow, 2017). “How many little children, six – or seven – 
year olds, know who the president of their country is?” asked an elated Catalan comedian, 
echoing the thoughts of many “This is amazing” (Albà, 2018, cited in Brunat, 2018, para. 4). 
"What do we do with all (this) joyful commitment” asked a a Guardian columnist in 2014, 
thinking along similar lines “with the biggest surge of creative democratic energy that 
Scotland has ever seen?" (Ascherson, 2014, para. 18).  
 
However, it is important to remember that democracy is an essentialy contested 
concept (Norris, 2013) and that there are exist very different understandings of what 
democracy entails. What “Euro – nationalists” are proposing is that a part of their demos (the 
“Catalan people” in Spain and the “Scottish people” in Britain) should separate itself from 
the rest of the demos if said separation is backed by a majority of the aforementioned part. 
While the practical implications of this proposal in Catalonia and Scotland are as of yet 
unclear, the idea that a part of a demos can choose to break up from the whole is controversial 
in its own right and (in the absence of human rights violations) considered un – democratic 
by some:  
 
“Why should one assume that the mere fact of residence in an area authorizes persons to decide by 
majority vote not only to change their own citizenship but also to deprive others (the nonsecessionists) of 
their citizenship?”                                                                               
   (Buchanan, 2017, para. 30) 
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We saw in the Romeva interview how it is possible to conflate the excersise of 
democracy with the pursuit of national self – determination (Romeva, 2015). Democracy in 
itself does not demand that every national group pursue formal statehood, because the right to 
self – determination can be excersised comfortably from within a democratic state 
(Buchanan, 2017), with regions such as Québec in Canada or Bavaria in Germany being a 
case in point. 
 
More importantly, the European Union may possess impressive normative credentials 
(Kenealy, 2014), but it certainly should not be considered democratic in the ordinary sense of 
the word (Hewitson & D'Auria, 2012; DiEM25, 2018). Most of its institutions of government 
are un – elected, and ordinary Europeans have little say in the politically motivated policies 
of a Central Bank which left the EU Member States of the Mediterranean to shoulder the 
burden of the sovereign debt crisis while their Northern neighbors prospered (DiEM25, 
2018). We should be clear that the (democratic) energy currently being expended in certain 
EU regions is being expended on behalf of the creation of new states and not, as some 
politicians have claimed, on behalf of democracy (Romeva, 2015).  
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation concludes having answered the two guiding questions posed at the 
end of the introduction. We can indeed say that the Generalitat and the Scottish Government 
have been acting as “normative entrepreneurs”, on the basis that their political proposals for 
an “internal enlargement” of the European Union would have far – reaching normative 
effects if put into practice. As to the question of what aspects of their “political norm” can be 
regarded as problematic, I have identified the following five areas:  
 
• Suggestions that Catalonia or Scotland are entitled to become EU Member States 
based on their European history, echoed if not stated explicitly in Puigdemont’s 
(2017) speech. 
 
• The incompatibility of the grievance – based nationalism espoused by Puigdemont 
(2017) and Sturgeon (2017) with the ideals of the European Union. 
 
• The problematic associations of an “internal enlargement” with the Enlightenment 
made by Jenkins (2013) and Romeva (2015). 
 
• The suggestion by Jenkins (2013) and Romeva (2015) that an “internal 
enlargement” would be easy. 
 
• And finally, the problematic association that Salmond (2014) and others have 




This list is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of all the areas of “internal 
enlargement” that could be considered problematic. Neither was it the intention of this 
dissertation to discredit disqualify proponents of secession from Britain or Spain. Particularly 
in Spain, where concerns remain as to whether the Spanish state has rejected the ways of 
dictator Francisco Franco entirely (Amnesty International, 2017; Cotarelo, 2018), many 
Catalans can make a convincing case that they should be allowed to secede. 
 
However, I am sceptical of the idea of “internal enlargement” of “independence – in – 
Europe” on normative grounds. The right to self – determination can be exercised within a 
democratic state (Buchanan, 2017), and there is both willingness and the ability to re – dress 
the wrongs that these regions have suffered (Torrance, 2013; Sanz, 2018) within their current 
institutional settings. More importantly, making formal statehood more attractive to the 
multiplicity of EU regions that would seek it will do little to address the institutional short – 
comings of the Union (Lewis, 2013) or the economic, social, political and ecological crises 
which it currently faces (DiEM25, 2018).  
 
For this reason, I have sought a critique of “internal enlargement” through the de – 
construction of the discourse of powerful politicians on “internal enlargement”, showing that 
their understanding of European integration features a series of fallacies, contradictions, 
conflations and mis – representations which could be reproduced should the potentiality 
described in Chapter Two ever come to pass. To answer the re – formulated Weiler question: 
the political self that would be born from an “internal enlargement” would be a 
fundamentally self – centered one (Weiler, 2012, pg. 911), a figure at odds with an 
organisation working toward the “political, economic and monetary union” between its 
Member States (European Commission, 2016, para. 5) 
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As a side benefit, I have arrived upon data on some of the discursive strategies that 
the five political leaders used to advocate for “internal enlargement” within the framework of 
the Discourse Historical Approach. While not a complete typology, this list may serve to 
inform a more complete study in the future: 
 
Table 4: Overview of featured discursive strategies 
 
Discursive Strategy Application in proposals of “internal enlargement” 
Nomination • Discursive construction “Catalan” and 
“Scottish” peoples as distinct from “Spanish” 
or “British” ones (Puigdemont, 2017; 
Sturgeon, 2017) 
 
• Discursive construction of “Brexit” as an 
English phenomenon (Sturgeon, 2017). 
 
 
Predication • British and Spanish states instransigent; 
Spanish state repressive (Puigdemont, 2017; 
Sturgeon, 2017). 
 
• Assumption of a common rationality across 
EU Member States (Jenkins, 2013; Romeva, 
2015). 
 
Argumentation • Secession justified because central state has 
neglected region (Romeva, 2015; 
Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017). 
 
• “Brexit” is an English imposition on Scotland 
(Sturgeon, 2017). 
 
• “Internal enlargement” will not be a legal 
decision (Jenkins, 2013; Salmond, 2014; 
Romeva, 2015). 
 
• Once secession takes place, Member States 
will act in Enlightened self – interest (Jenkins, 




Is there a better alternative to a “Europe of the Regions”? 
 
 Yes. A Europe that is post – national is considered by many to be highly desirable 
(DiEM25, 2018). The existence of a self – contained “peoples” is both historically 
contentious and subjective, in that a “peoples” is ultimately grounded in inter – subjectively 
held beliefs and not, as some nationalists suggest, in nature (Hobsbawm, 1993; Anderson, 
2006; Cotarelo). In addition to this, national ego – centrism has – historically – been the main 
antagonist to European integration (Hewitson & D'Auria, 2012; Phinnemore, 2013; Urwin, 
2013), and the stage is set for this trend to continue. Witness how reaching a deal that 
addresses the plight of refugees on the EU’s southern border has proven nigh impossible for 
EU Member States this summer (Al Jazeera, 2018; Balmer, et al., 2018; Cendrowicz, 2016). 
 
 The creation of a European demos and of truly representative European institutions 
could go a long way in both safe – guarding the gains of European integration and allowing 
us to address the existential, trans – national crises we face, such as climate change or the 
migrant crisis, in a more effective way (DiEM25, 2018). Habermas’ proposal for the creation 
of a European contstitution would, if adopted, constitute a powerful step toward this goal 
• Negative legal argument (Romeva, 2015). 
 
Perspectivization • The struggle for “internal enlargement” is 
fundamentally about democracy (Salmond, 
2014; Romeva, 2015)  
Intensification/ Mitigation • Stress placed on exceptional neglect of region 
by central state which has led us to this 
situation (Puigdemont, 2017; Sturgeon, 2017) 
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(Habermas, 2001). According to Habermas, a European constitution could, potentially, act as 
a catalyst for the creation of the United States of Europe: 
 
“Once the European Union gained financial autonomy, the Commission assumed the functions of a 
government and the Council became something like a second chamber…the focus on politics would move 
to some extent from national capitals to the European centre. The perceived trans – national overlap of 
parallel interests would give rise to…a properly European party system” 
 (Habermas, 2001, pg. 11) 
  
This would leave the European public in a qualitatively better place than it is today, at 
the mercy of institutions derived from an incomplete process of European integration. 
Making the European Central Bank accountable to European voters could ensure that the 
burden of the next financial crisis is not shared differentially across Member States. An 
intensification of cross – border connections in the life of everyday Europeans could generate 
greater solidarity with other “peoples” and a greater willigness to reach agreements on 
difficult issues such as climate change and migration, in addition to the willigness to shoulder 
difficult burdens. And a greater sense of internal unity in the EU could contribute greatly to 
its clout on the world stage, which would in turn strengthen its ability to deliver on the issues 
that matter for Europeans. There is an ample base of values (respect for the environment, post 
– modernism, non – interventionism) upon which a common European foreign policy could 
be constructed (Habermas, 2001).   
 
This highly desirable change cannot take place so long as our focus is on the creation 
of national borders and boundaries between Europeans, which is the main concern of 
opportunistic “Euro – nationalist” politicians. But they, too, can work toward this goal if they 
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decide to capitalize on the democratic impetus they have created in their regions and re – 
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